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judgment before a default has taken place under installment con-
tracts of under $1500. 91 The fact that so many states have abolished
confession judgments or restricted their use in consumer transactions
without causing significant increases in the cost of credit 92 indicates
that the commercial advantages of their use may be minimal. But
without state or federal legislative action, attacks in the courts on
existing procedures can only result in piecemeal reform. Since the
Virgin Islands decision has potential value as precedent in litigation
involving confession judgments in other federal jurisdictions, its
impact may exceed the geographic limitations of the island district in
which it was made. But until the Supreme Court resolves the extant
procedural questions" involving the nature and form of hearings
concerning waiver, judicial reform will remain the product of dispar-
ate case-by-case advances. By its reluctance in Swart) to address
these questions, the Court has signaled its intention that the pros-
pects for the general reevaluation of confession judgment procedures
remain in the legislative province.
JEAN S. PERWIN
Copyright Law—Exclusivity of Constitutional Grant of Copyright
Power to Federal Government—Supremacy Clause and Federal
Preemption—Durational Limit of Copyright—Goldstein v.
California) —Donald Goldstein and others, manufacturers and
vendors of sound tapes and cartridges, engaged in the practice
known as "tape piracy." 2 They made exact reproductions on master
tapes of record albums purchased on the open market from retail
distributors. 3 Additional copies of the master tapes were made on
machines known as "tape slaves." The tapes were marketed in
plastic cartridges, labelled with the title of the original album, the
name of the artist, the name of the original record company, and a
disclaimer of any relationship with the original artist or record
company. 4
In 1970, Tape Industries Association of America and others,
N.V. Pers. Prop. Law art, 9, § 302.13 (McKinney Supp. 1973); N.Y. CPLR §§ 3201,
3218 (McKinney 1963).
92 Sec Hopson, supra note 79, at 125.
93 The opportunity for the Court to review this question will have to come in a case other
than Virgin Islands, since there was no appeal taken, presumably because the defendant
never appeared at the hearing for lack of a defense. Letter from John L. Rogers, Clerk, to
Judge Warren H. Young, United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands,
Oct. 15, 1973.
412 U.S. 546 (1973).
Id. at 549.
3
 The method of operation is fully explained in Tape Indus. Ass'n of America v.
Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340, 342-43 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
4
 The label read as follows:
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joined by one of petitioners, brought.an action in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California for injunctive
and declaratory relief against the District Attorney of Los Angeles
County. 5
 They challenged the constitutionality of section 653h of the
California Penal Code, 6
 which prohibited the duplication, with in-
tent to sell, of any sounds recorded on records or tapes without the
permission of the owner of the original master tape.' The court held
that the statute was a permissible state regulation directed against
theft and appropriation of saleable products and was not an uncon-
stitutional interference with federal policies enunciated in the
copyright clause of the United States Constitution and in the federal
copyright laws. 8
Following this favorable decision, the District Attorney of Los
Angeles County filed an information against petitioners for violating
section 653h. They filed a plea of nolo contendere to 10 of the 140
counts charged against them and were convicted. The court denied
their contention, made on motion to dismiss the complaint, that
section 653h conflicted with the copyright clause of the United States
Constitution and the federal statutes enacted thereunder. 9 The Ap-
pellate Department of the Superior Court of California for the
County of Los Angeles affirmed the conviction and sustained the
validity of section 653h.'° Petitioners exhausted all other appellate
remedies in the state."
No relationship of any kind exists between [petitioners] and the original recording
company nor between this recording and the original recording artist. This tape is
not produced under a license of any kind from the original company nor the
recording artist(s) and neither the original recording company nor the artist(s) re-
ceives a fee or royalty of any kind from [petitioners]. Permission to produce this tape
has not been sought nor obtained from any party whatsoever.
316 F. Supp. at 343.
5
 Tape Indus. Ass'n of America v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
• Cal. Penal Code § 653h (West 1970). The text of § 653h provides in relevant part:
(a) Every person is guilty of a misdemeanor who:
(1) Knowingly and willfully transfers or causes to be transferred any sounds
recorded on a phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, film or other article on which
sounds are recorded, with intent to sell or cause to be sold ... without the consent of
the owner.
• It was argued that the statute provided "quasi-copyright" protection unlimited in time
for musical recordings which were in the public domain,, 316 F. Supp. at 344, thereby
conflicting with an exclusive constitutional mandate to Congress "tt]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (the
copyright clause). Plaintiffs advocated the application to their case of the broad interpretation
of the preemption doctrine enunciated in the United States Supreme Court decisions in Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and Compco Corp. v, Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964), precluding states from proscribing duplications not proscribed by
Congress. 316 F. Supp. at 344-45. See discussion of the preemption doctrine in text at notes
75-109 infra.
8
 316 F. Supp. at 351. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970).
' See 412 U.S. at 548-49. The opinion of the trial court was unreported.
1 ° The opinion of the appellate department was unreported.
I' "The appellate department certified the case for appeal but the Court of Appeals
637
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Thè United States Supreme Court granted the petition for cer-
tiorari to review both the conviction under California law and the
constitutionality of section 653h which had been adjudicated origi-
nally in federal 'district court." At the outset, the Court noted" that
the pirated recordings were produced prior to the enactment of the
amendment to the Copyright Act," which extended protection to
sound.
 recordings produced between February 15, 1972 and January
1, 1975." Applying prior law, the Court affirmed the conviction in a
5 to 4 decision" and. HELD: the outlawing of tape piracy by
California statute is a valid exercise of the state's power, which it
retained under the Constitution, to grant copyrights for "writings"
which Congress had neither explicitly enumerated nor omitted from
protection within its copyright legislation." In arriving at this deci-
sion, the Court reached two conclusions of major significance for the
future of patent and copyright law. First, it found that the constitu-
tional mandate to Congress to provide copyright protection was not
exclusive." Second, it rejected a broad interpretation of the federal,
preemption doctrine" enunciated in Sears, Roebuck & Co.•v. Stiffel
Co. 2° and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 2 ' Thus, the
Court established a theoretical framework in which a state-by-state
system of varying laws, rather than a uniform federal system, could
control all federally. unprotected classes of "writings," including
developing classes which as yet seem insignificant.
Admittedly the Court's condemnation of tape piracy appears to
stem from justifiable moral indignation and a sense of fair play. 22
However, honest legal analysis does not necessarily lead to the
Court's conclusion that state statutes prohibiting tape piracy must be
upheld in the absence of an explicit federal pronouncement either for
rejected the certification. Thus, under California law, all avenues of appeal had been ex-
hausted." Letter from Arthur Leeds, Esq., attorney for Goldstein, Nov. 5, 1973.
' 3 412 U.S. at 548.
13
 Id. at 552.
" Pub. L. No. 92-140 (Oct. 15, 1971), amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970), allowing
for the first time federal copyright protection of sound recordings.
" Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3 (Oct. 15, 1971). It is noteworthy that, when Congress finally
extended copyright protection to sound recordings, it chose only a small group to protect
—those produced within the three year interval. See note 122 infra for suggested reasons for
this cautious approach. Petitioners in Goldstein did not raise a question as to the power of the
states to protect recordings produced after Feb. 15, 1972. 412 U.S. at 552 n.7.
lb The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Burger. Justices Marshall and
Douglas wrote separate dissenting opinions in which Justices Brennan and Blackmun con-
curred.
12
 412 U.S. at 571.
U Id. at 556-57.
lb Id. at 569-70.
'° 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
21 376 U.S. 234 (1964). For a discussion of the Sears-Compco principle, see The Supreme
Court, 1963 Term, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 309 (1964); Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 101 (1965). See
also text at notes 75-109 infra.
22
 See Yarnell, Recording Piracy is Everybody's Burden: An Examination of its Causes,




or against copyright protection generally. This note will examine the
validity of the Court's holding in light of the scope of prior copyright
and patent law. It will be argued briefly that section 653h should
have been invalidated, since a constitutional grant of exclusive
copyright power to the federal government is the only route to
meaningful protection for authors. Second, it will be suggested that
federal law should preempt a state statute proscribing tape piracy in
order to preserve a federal competitive policy which promotes free
use of ideas in the public domain while offering a reward for
creative endeavors. A state proscription against record duplication
for unlimited times will then be criticized for conflicting with the
spirit if not the letter of the constitutional mandate to Congress to
extend such protection for limited times. Finally, given the need in
this area for a detailed federal regulatory scheme, it will be con-
cluded that extension of copyright protection to all tapes and rec-
ords, without regard to date of production, 23
 is more properly an
area for congressional initiative.
EXCLUSIVITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL GRANT OF
FEDERAL COPYRIGHT POWER '
The Goldstein Court decided that the power to grant copyrights
is not exclusive in the federal government. 24
 It is submitted that the
Court's conclusion is unreasonable, as demonstrated by an examina-
tion of the policies enunciated in the copyright clause. 25 In a system
of free competition, an author may be disinclined to expend time
and energy in the production of creative works for ultimate public
consumption if, after disclosure, he will gain neither profit nor
reputation. Therefore, as an incentive to produce and disclose new
works, 26
 Congress has awarded to an author an exclusive property
right in his work, 27 which serves as a limited exemption from the
antitrust mandate of free competition. 28
 This benefits the general
public by providing new writings and discoveries for their use, as'
well as a stimulant to further creativity. 29 The author's exclusive
23
 See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text,
24
 412 U,S. at 552-60.
25
 See note 7 supra for text of clause, The copyright power in the United States depends
wholly on the legislation of Congress, passed pursuant to the copyright clause. Wheaton v.
Peters, 33 U.S. 374, 420.21, 8 Pet. 591, 661-64 (1834).
26
 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
27
 See 1 M, Nimmer, Copyright § 3.1 (1973), for the view that copyright is a property
right.
28
 This exemption is effectively a monopoly, However, the term monopoly used herein is
not necessarily the same as that used in the antitrust held. See Justice Douglas' dissent in
Goldstein as an example of the use of the term in a copyright context. 412 U.S. at 574
(Douglas, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the differing meanings of monopoly in the
context of the interaction of patent law and antitrust law, see Note, 15 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L.
Rev. 119, 125-26 & n.40 (1973). .
29
 The primary purpose of the copyright clause is to maximize the availability of new
639
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right to his work is thus at the very heart of the copyright scheme.
In this economy, where the rule of free competition is commonly
accepted, the copyright clause would be redundant unless it con-
ferred the exceptional status of exclusive monopoly ownership.
In concluding that the power to grant copyrights is concurrent
in the state and federal governments, 30 the Court in Goldstein
apparently believed that the essential status of exclusive monopoly
ownership would not be diminished by concurrent copyright author-
ity in the federal and state governments. It is suggested that such a
belief does not withstand scrutiny.
The majority in Goldstein conceded the advantage of a nation-
wide system of protection for works of national importance:
[To obtain protection in all states] a separate application is
required to each state government; the right which in turn
may be granted has effect only within the granting State's
borders. The national system . . . eliminates the need for
multiple applications and the expense and difficulty
involved. 3 '
Nevertheless, they found that all works were not of national impor-
tance, and that some works were purely local in nature and there-
fore required only local protection. 32 To support this view, the
Court noted that the copyright clause did not designate all works to
be of national importance, or state copyright protection to be en-
tirely impermissible. 33
 The Court further asserted that the size of the
United States' population and the diversity of its national origins
inevitably resulted in purely local concerns requiring state
protection.34 -
On the basis of this local-national distinction, whereby the
states and the federal government could have different realms of
authority, the Court concluded that exercise of copyright power by
the states was permissible35
 in that it would not be "totally con-
tradictory and repugnant" to the federal exercise of copyright
powers. 36
 It is submitted, however, that the local-national distinc-
tion is fictitious in this day and age and is therefore an improper
works to the public. Fox-Film Corp, v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932). Therefore, the
copyright clause limits the author's exclusive right to that finite period of time deemed by
Congress to be sufficient to promote the desired level of intellectual output. Kurlantzick, The
Constitutionality of State Law Protection of Sound Recordings, 5 Conn. L. Rev. 204, 223
(1972). For further discussion of the durational limit, see notes 110-20 infra and accompanying
text.
30
 412 U.S. at 552-60,
31 Id. at 556,
32 Id. at 558.
33
 Id. at 556-57.
14
 Id. at 557-58.
35 Id. at 558.
36
 Id. at 552-53, citing the standard enunciated in The Federalist No. 32, at 199-200 (J.
Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
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ground for rejecting the exclusivity of federal copyright power.
Because of modern communication and transportation networks, all
industries have outgrown any purely local importance they may
have had when the Copyright Act was originally enacted. 37 There-
fore, any protection of an author's reputation and profits must be
national in scope if it is to be exclusive to him and sufficiently
valuable to encourage him to create.
After propounding its untenable theory of the local-national
distinction, the Court turned to a denial of the potential conflict
existing between states exercising concurrent powers and between
states and the federal government. As to the interstate conflict, the
Court said that it was neither "so inevitable nor so severe as to
compel the conclusion, that state power has been relinquished to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress." 38
However, Justice Douglas suggested in his dissent that unifor-
mity was espoused in the copyright clause in order to avoid the
inevitable conflicts between states' interests." For support, Douglas
relied on the dissent in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records
Corp.," a case involving the duplication of uncopyrighted sound
recordings, where Judge Learned' Hand discussed the copyright
clause:
If, for example in the case at bar, the defendant is forbid-
den to make and sell these records in New York, that will
not prevent it from making and selling them in any other
state which may regard the plaintiff's sales as a "publica-
tion"; and it will be practically impossible to prevent their
importation into New York. That is exactly the kind of
evil at which the clause is directed.'"
Such inevitable conflict between the interests of two states is neces-
sarily severe. Artists, realizing that their labors would receive only
local protection while their creations were nationally accessible,
would eventually stop devoting their energies for public benefit. 42
Turning to the potential conflict between state and federal
governments, the Goldstein Court concluded that a concurrent exer-
cise of copyright power would not necessarily lead to conflict. 43
Implicit in the reasoning here was the Court's underlying assump-
tion that if Congress in the national interest expressed an intention
37 316 F. Supp. at 343-44. See Kurlantzick, supra note 29, at 238-39, for a negative
answer to the question of whether, in light of the commerce clause, U.S. Const, art. I, § 8,
cl. 3, one state may prohibit within its borders• the sale of a duplicated record produced in
another state.
39 412 U.S. at 558.
39 Id. at 575 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
49 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
41 Id. at 667 (Hand, J,, dissenting).
42 For a discussion of the injuries to artists and record companies, see Yarnell, supra
note 22, at 236.
43
 412 U.S. at 559.
641,
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neither for freedom nor for protection of a work, the state was at
liberty to legislate as to that work." In-contrast, Justice Douglas
found that "free access to products on the market is the consumer
interest protected by the failure of Congress to extend patents or
copyrights into various areas." 45 He referred to the Court's previ-
ously expressed policy of national uniformity and found it "bolstered
by Acts of Congress which vest 'exclusive jurisdiction to hear patent
and copyright cases in federal courts . . . and that section of the
Copyright Act which expressly saves state protection of unpublished
writings but does not include published writings.' "46 It is submitted
that Justice Douglas' view is correct, given the present statutory
copyright system in which only classes of writings enumerated in the
law may receive federal protection.'" Otherwise, if congressional
silence meant the absence of federal interest and a free rein to the
states to protect unenumerated classes of works, then Congress
would have left no class of works expressly or impliedly within the
public domain. Thus, congressional silence arguably implies con-
gressional intent to leave unenumerated classes of works in free
competition, and therefore state protection would interfere with
congressional policy."
PREEMPTION OF STATE PROTECTION
Even if it were logical to reach the conclusion the Court
reached—that concurrent powers are not totally contradictory and
repugnant—state copyright statutes would fail on other grounds.
They would be contrary to the supremacy clause in that they would
interfere with national policies reflected in the federal Copyright
Act" and the federal preemption doctrine enunciated in Sears and
Compca . 5°
Section 4 of the federal Copyright Act provides that "[t]he
works for which copyright may be secured under this title shall
include all the writings of an author." 5 ' Section 5, after first
enumerating categories of "writings" protected by the Act, then
provides that qtjhe above specifications shall not be held to limit the
subject matter of copyright as defined in section 4 of this title.
.. 
."52
 A commonsensical reading of these sections could lead to a
41 Id .
45 Id. at 574 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
46
 Id. at 573 (Douglas, J., dissenting), quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225, 231 n.7 (1964). Presumably, Justice Douglas was referring to 28 U.S.C, § 1338
(1970) and 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
42 17	 §§ 4, 5 (1970).
48 412 U.S. at 574 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
49 17 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970).
50 See notes 20 and 21 supra.
61 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
92 17 U.S.C.	 5 (1970). The term "writings" is interpreted to include any physical




construction of the Act as providing all-encompassing protection for
all original expressions of ideas. However, the courts have not read
"writings" in section 4 to include sound recordings. 53
 There are
several reasons. First, "authors" are the people protected by this
1909 Act. 54
 Where the authorship of music is concerned, section 1(e)
of the Act provides specific and limited protection against unau-
thorized copying for composers. Thus, Congress considered the
composers of music—not the performers who recorded it—to be the
authors. 55
 Second, courts may not have included sound recordings
within the meaning of the Act on the grounds that record companies
did not constitute a large enough industry to require protection in
1909, when the Act was passed. 56
 In addition, courts may have
reasoned that, by its terms, the Act did not apply to sound
recordings," since it failed to provide a suitable protective scheme
for records, both as to notice and deposit requirements 58 and as to
scope of protection. 59
 It might be argued that, notwithstanding these
minor points, courts could still have construed the Act to include
sound recordings. Alternatively, the meaning of any act could argu-
ably be expanded to cover new technologies. However, with the
exception of one case decided before the effective date of the 1909
Act, 6 ° all of the case law supports exclusion of sound recordings
from the scope of the Act." In light of this judicial history and in
53 See Kurlantzick, supra note 29, at 210-11, As the Goldstein Court pointed out, the
precursor of this problem was whether piano rolls were to be considered "writings." 412 U.S.
at 565-66. The Court decided that question in the negative. White-Smith Music Publishing
Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. I, 18 (1908). See also Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records
Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 661 (2d Cir. 1955); 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 27, § 35,21. Even after a
long line of cases, the legislature did not amend the'Copyright Act to cover sound recordings.
In fact, the Copyright Office regulations explicitly stated that the Office would not register a
musical composition for copyright by deposit of a recording. 37 C.F.', R. § 202.8(b) (1973).
54
 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1970). This term has been construed to mean "he to whom anything
owes its origin . . ." Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111  U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
55
 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970), Section 1(e) provides a system of compulsory licensing which
provides the public with access to a composition, while assuring compensation to the com-
poser. Section 1(e) thus indicates that Congress' concern in this law was with composers, and
so protection of sound recordings produced by record companies arguably falls outside the
language of the Act.
56
 See Kurlantzick, supra note 29, at 209.
57 Id. at 210.
58
 Section 19 of the Act requires notice of copyright to appear on the copyrighted item
itself, Section 13 requires deposit of two copies of the item in the Copyright Office, which
from the statutory language appears to be best-equipped to handle copies or descriptions
thereof on paper, not on discs. 17 U.S.C. §§ 13, 19 (1970), Conceivably these details could be
handled by stretching the statutory language. Kurlantzick, supra note 29, at 210.
59
 Zechariah Chafee, Jr. believed that the lack of remedial clauses appropriate to records
in the 1909 Act was the best objection to copyrighting records under that law. He suggested
that a new statute should say whether the conductor or the manufacturer was to be entitled to
copyright, fix the measure of damages, and determine the scope of infringement. Chafee,
Reflections on Copyright Law: II, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 719, 736 (1945).
6" Fonotipia Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 F. 951, 963 (E.D.N.Y. 1909).
61
 See 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 27, § 35.21. See, e.g., Jerome v. Twentieth Century
Fox-Film Corp., 67 F. Supp. 736, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd, 165 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1948);
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 661 (2d Cir. 1955).
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view of legislation to the contrary, courts would therefore be
justified in continuing their past interpretation, thus leaving sound
recordings as a class of "writings" not explicitly protected by the
Act.
Assuming the Goldstein Court's position for the moment—that
the Constitution leaves the exercise of copyright power concurrently
in the state and federal governments—and acknowledging that the
copyright protection granted by the federal Copyright Act of 1909
does not explicitly extend to sound recordings, then one logical
conclusion is that protection of sound recordings must be left to the
states. Using International News Service v. Associated Press 2 as an
analogy, the- Goldstein Court argued in favor of such state
protection." In International News Service (INS), the Associated
Press (AP) sued the International News Service (INS), its competitor
in gathering and distributing news, for appropriating AP news from.
AP-issued bulletins for the purpose of selling to INS clients before
AP clients received it. The Court enjoined INS from continuing its
appropriation of AP's news bulletins on the basis of common law
unfair competition:
Stripped of all disguises, the process amounts to an unau-
thorized interference with the normal operation of
complainant's legitimate business precisely at the point
where the profit is to be reaped, in order to divert a
material portion of the profit from those who have earned
it to those who have not; with special advantage to defen-
dant in the competition because of .the fact that it is not
burdened with any part of the expense of gathering the
news. The transaction speaks for itself, and a court of
equity ought not to hesitate long in characterizing it as
unfair competition in business."
The Supreme Court in INS, noting that the misrepresentation ele-
ment was absent from the charge of unfair competition, said that
misappropriation took the place of misrepresentation in this case. 65
The Court further held that its decision' would not create monopoly
control over news events: INS would still be able to use AP news
bulletins, which it had had no part in gathering, but only after the
time during which AP clients had been serviced and AP had reaped
its profits. 66
The connection between INS and Goldstein is apparent. In
both, a "misappropriator" made his living not by misrepresentation
but simply by copying the finished work of another and selling it,
62 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
63 412 U.S. at 570. See also Tape Indus. Ass'n of America v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340,
349 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
64 248 U.S. at 240.
65 Id. at 241-42.
66 Id. at 241.
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thereby reducing the other's profits. However, the Goldstein Court's
reliance on INS was questionable, as suggested by Justice Brandeis'
dissent in INS. In a famous passage, quoted in part by Chief Justice
Burger in Goldstein 67 to support the point of view which Brandeis
actually disparaged, Brandeis stated:
An essential element of individual property is the legal
right to exclude others from enjoying it.... But the fact
that a product of the mind has cost its producer money and
labor, and has a value for which others are willing to pay,
is not sufficient to ensure to'it this legal attribute of prop-
erty. The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human
productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions,
and ideas—become, after voluntary communication to
others, free as the air to common use. Upon these incor-
poreal productions the attribute of property is continued
after such communication only' in certain classes of cases
. . . . These exceptions are confined to productions which,
in some degree, involve creation, invention, or discovery.
. . . [A]nd these have also protection under the copyright
statutes."
Justice Brandeis, dissenting in this case of first impression, viewed
the bulletins as "publications" which were unprotected by federal
copyright statutes and therefore open to anyone to copy. Brandeis
argued that such copying could not be declared unauthorized, as
long as it was not performed illegally, and as long as no party to a
contract breached the contract in the copying process. 69 Believing
that the "propriety of some remedy" was "clear," Brandeis thought
that the Court was ill-equipped to prescribe detailed regulations "to
redress a newly-disclosed wrong," and therefore he suggested leav-
ing the problem to legislative resolution. 7 °
The same arguments can be made against the Goldstein deci-
sion. Since federal copyright legislation did not extend to the sound
recordings in question, Goldstein ,could copy the albums, because
the copying of federally unprotected sound recordings was open to
all. Further, as long as Goldstein did the copying without violation
of law or contract, he was totally within his rights; and, since the
courts would be ill-equipped to prescribe detailed regulations for this
"newly-disclosed wrong" of tape piracy, the problem should be left
to Congress.
Moreover, even if INS were properly decided on its facts, the
decision is not necessarily dispositive of the Goldstein question be-
cause the controlling policy reasons are arguably different in the two
67
 412 U.S. at 570.
" 248 U.S. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 251-53 (Brandeis, J,, dissenting).
7°
 1(1, at 267 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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cases. First, as the INS majority pointed out, no monopoly on news
was created by its decision. 7 ' In contrast, under Goldstein, once the
record companies had published particular records, the records
could never be copied in California. Second, questions of news
coverage differ qualitatively from questions concerning mechanical
reproductions of artistic creations. The INS Court imposed restric-
tions on INS which enhanced the public's First Amendment right of
access to news coverage by multiple sources. 72 The protection of this
First Amendment right is of such paramount importance in a demo-
cracy that it may indeed be enough to justify a decision such as INS,
notwithstanding Brandeis' concern with an anticompetitive effect.
In contrast, while the encouragement of artistic creation is also of
constitutional magnitude," it is arguably of a different order of
importance than news reporting, and may therefore be deemed
insufficient justification for allowing record companies the anticom-
petitive privilege of exclusive and perpetual rights to reproduce their
records. 74
State attempts to grant quasi-copyright protection to sound
recordings bring into question the applicability of Sears and Compco
as to copyright protection." Prior to these decisions, state unfair
competition laws had commonly been enforced to prohibit the unau-
thorized duplication of unpatentable articles. 76 This provided pro-
tection against competitors for the designer-retailer who had created
something new and commercially valuable, but not worthy of fed-
eral patent protection. 77
 In broad language, the Sears and Compco
decisions invalidated the traditional state protection of articles in the
7 ' Id. at 241.
72
 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stating that the First
Amendment right of media viewers and listeners to access to all points of view on the media is
paramount). On the other hand, INS's free speech right to publish any and all news reports
was diminished by the INS decision upholding what was effectively copyright protection. For
the view that the notions of free speech and copyright are compatible, see Nimmer, Does
Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17
U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1180 (1970).
" U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
74 In addition, the applicability of INS to Goldstein is questionable because it was heard
in the Supreme Court solely because of diversity of citizenship, before the doctrine of Erie
A.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), became iaw. See CBS v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 318
(1st Cir. 1967) (stating that INS is no longer authoritative, on grounds of the Erie doctrine).
Today, under the Erie doctrine, the same case would have to be decided on the basis of the
unfair competition law controlling in the state in which the federal court was sitting. The rule
of INS, at least vis-à-vis cases based on state laws, would seem, then, to have been divested
of some of its value as precedent.
75
 See notes 20 and 21 supra.
76
 This was generally judge-made law. See Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 101, 103 (1965).
77
 The federal patent law, passed pursuant to the copyright clause, provides patent
protection for "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof," and for
"[wlhoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture
. . . ." 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 171 (1970). Many creations have not been considered novel enough
for protection. See Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 101 (1965).
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public domain's as conflicting with the federal patent and copyright
statutory scheme.
Sears concerned a claim by Stiffel of patent infringement and of
unfair competition under Illinois law. 79 Sears marketed a pole lamp
which was substantially identical to one patented and sold by Stiffel.
The Seventh Circuit, affirming the district court, found the patents
invalid for want of invention, but enjoined Sears from selling its
pole lamp because the remarkable similarity to Stiffel's lamp was
likely to cause confusion. 8° The Supreme Court reversed the
decision." The Court recalled that the copyright power had been
given to the federal government via the copyright clause of the
Constitution." The Court then said that if state power touching on
the copyright area were permitted, the federal power would be
diminished. 83 The Court further reasoned that states could encroach
on federal patent laws neither directly by state patent laws nor
indirectly under, another type of law, such as an unfair competition
law, because such a state law would clash with objectives of the
federal patent laws." .
Compco was also an action under the Illinois unfair competition
law. Compco was marketing fluorescent light components, which
were substantially identical to those on which Day-Brite had a
design patent. 85 The Seventh Circuit, affirming the district court,
declared Day-Brite's design patent invalid, but enjoined. Compco's
marketing as unfair competition resulting in confusion among con-
sumers as to the source of the components. 86 The Supreme Court
reversed the decision. 87 The Court held that a state could not forbid
the copying of articles unprotected by federal copyright:
To forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy,
78 376 U.S. at 237. Articles which the federal government has determined are not entitled
to patent or copyright protection are said to be "in the public domain," and therefore legally
copiable "in every detail by whoever pleases," Id. at 238.
79 According to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, only the likelihood of
customer confusion as to the source of the products had to be proved in order to make a case
of unfair competition under Illinois law. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115,
118 n.7 (7th Cir. 1963), But see 376 U.S. at 227-28 n.2 for the Supreme Court's suggestion
that the court of appeals, by eliminating the need to prove misrepresentation, may have
extended the scope of the Illinois law of unfair competition far beyond the limits indicated by
previous Illinois case law and decisions of the Seventh Circuit.
6° .313 F.2d 115, 117-18 (7th Cir. 1963).
81 376 U.S. at 233.
82
 Id. at 228. The Court referred to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1970), giving exclusive
jurisdiction to federal courts to decide copyright cases, as an indication that copyright power
is lodged totally in the federal government. 376 U.S. at 231 n.7.
L 376 U.S. at 231.
4
 Id. In dicta, the Court noted that state laws requiring proper labelling of items as to
source would be valid. Id. at 232.
" For the distinction between various patents, see note 77 supra.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26, 28-30 (7th Cir. 1963). The
court of appeals held that a design for such a component was a protectable right under Illinois
law. Id. at 29.
87 376 U.S. at 239.
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- found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the
implementing federal statutes, of allowing free access to
copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave
in the public domain. 88
Although the case dealt with a patented device, the Court in express
terms rejected exertion of state power in both the patent and
copyright fields. B 9 Significantly, the Court conceded that, if the
federal government had not granted patent or copyright protection
to an item, the inference to be drawn was that the item was to
remain unprotected and freely accessible to all, not that the states
were fiee to protect the item as well. 90 This doctrine has come to be
known as the Sears-Compco principle. -
The Goldstein Court found the Sears-Compco fact situations to
be distinguishable." The unpatentable articles at issue in Sears and
Compco—although not meeting the statutory criteria for
patentability—were nevertheless within the broad classes of inven-
tions afforded federal protection by the patent statutes. 92 In con-
trast, the Court reasoned that the sound recordings at issue in
Goldstein had not been brought within the more selective categories
of writings receiving federal protection under the copyright
statutes. 93
 In other words, the Court implied that the Sears-Compco
principle was inapplicable" to discoveries or writings which were
entirely outside the scope of federal protection. Rather, the Sears
Compco principle was applicable only to discoveries or writings
which were within the scope of federal protection, but not
sufficiently creative to warrant this protection.
It is important to note that there are two types of criteria which
a discovery must meet before receiving a patent. First, it must
belong to one of the broad categories of items eligible for protection.
In other words, it must fall within the general scope of patent
protection." Then, it must be shown to be new and useful, novel,
33 Id. at 237.
39 Id. The Court then repeated its Sears dicta, to the effect that state laws as to proper
labelling of sources of goods were valid. Id. at 238-39.
9° Note, 40 N.Y.L.I.L, Rev. 101, 107 (1965).
91
 412 U.S. at 571. In support of its position, the Court correctly bypassed the argument
that Sears and Compco were restricted by their facts to patent law. The Compco Court had
acknowledged the applicability of the principle to both patent and copyright law. 376 U.S. at
237. In addition, patent and copyright law should be treated similarly since they arise from
the same clause of the Constitution. 1 M. Nimmer, Copyright § 3 (1973). Following Sears and
Compco, courts have applied the Sears-Compco principle as dispositive of copyright cases.
See, e.g., Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV Inc., 335 F.2d 348, 351 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 989 (1965); CBS v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 321 (1st Cir. 1967). This would seem to
be the correct approach since patent and copyright laws serve the same needs of society: they
encourage creative thought by means of monopolies of limited duration in order to advance
the public welfare. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
92 412 U.S. at 569.
Id. at 570 n.28.
" 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 161, 171 (1970). The patent statutes explicitly cover discoveries in
the following seven general categories: processes, machines, manufactures, compositions of
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and non-obvious." Similar criteria must be met by a writing for
which a copyright is sought. First, the writing must belong to one of
the categories of items eligible for copyright protection. 96 Then, the
writing must be shown to be creative and original." Like that of the
Goldstein Court, the following analysis considers only the first
criterion—whether the item for which protection is sought belongs
to a category of items eligible for , the requested protection and
therefore falls under the statute in the first instance.
The Court's comparison of the reach of the patent and
copyright statutes is seemingly inaccurate, because the statutes are
written differently and should therefore be construed differently.
The patent statutes set out only broad categories of items eligible for
protection. 98 Therefore particular, items within these broad
categories only are eligible for patent protection. On the other hand,
section 4 of the Copyright Act sets out one broad category of items
eligible for protection—writings—while section 5 enumerates several
subcategories within this broad category. 99
In comparing the patent and copyright statutes, the issue before
the Goldstein Court was whether section 5 limits section 4. Two
conclusions are theoretically possible if an analogy is drawn between
the copyright and patent statutes. The conclusion reached by the
Goldstein Court was that all writings which do not fit into one of the
existing copyright subcategories should be treated in the same way
as all discoveries which do not fit into one of the broad patent
categories. As a result, in the eyes of the Court, such writings should
be considered outside the scope of federal copyright protection. tOO In
terms of the statute, the Goldstein, Court would have concluded,
then, that section 5 does limit section 4.
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, reached a different conclusion.
He reasoned that the language of section 4, embodying the constitu-
tional terms "writings" and "author," strongly suggested Congress'
intent to follow its full constitutional grant. '°' He then stated that,
instead of choosing to protect all writings, section 5 exhibited a
congressional intent to protect all writings within designated sub-
categories and to leave open to competition all writings in undesig-
matter, and useful improvements thereof (§ 101); plants (§ 161); and ornamental designs for
articles of manufacture (§ 171). As an indication of how broad these categories are, notice that
the term machines commonly includes everything from automobiles to electric toothbrushes.
However, a writing such as a book would not be eligible for patent protection since it would
not belong in any of the broad categories. Note that a statuette fitted as a lamp may be
patentable and yet still copyrighted. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1953).
95 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (1970).
96 The broad category is "writings." 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1970). Then several subcategories are
listed, including books, periodicals, lectures, musical compositions, maps, photographs, mo-
tion pictures, etc. 17 U.S,C. § 5 (1970).
97 Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.24 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945).
98 See note 94 supra.
99 17 U.S.C. §§ 4, 5 (1970). Sec note 96 supra.
1 °0 412 U.S. at 570.
'°' Id. at 577 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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nated subcategories. 102
 Noting that it is ordinarily difficult to.infer
affirmative conclusions from Congress' failure to act, Justice Mar-
shall interpreted Sears and Compco to have concluded that, with
respect to patent and copyrights, the ordinary practice was not to
prevail. In other words, Justice Marshall concluded that congres-
sional silence as to subcategories such as sound recordings was to
imply a preference for free competition and therefore a negation of
state authority to grant copyrights as to those subcategories. 103
Admitting that on their facts Sears and Compco applied to items in
broad categories which Congress had expressly enumerated, Justice
Marshall pointed to the . broad language used in those cases to
support his interpretation of the rule enunciated therein)" He
further refuted the majority's limiting construction of sections 4 and
5 with a reference to the legislative history of the copyright statute,
which suggested that, as to unlisted subcategories, Congress had
decided that removal from free competition was as yet unnecessary
to promote the art. Thus, as soon as copyright protection became
necessary for promotion of the industry, Congress stepped in.'° 8.
Accordingly, to compare unlisted subcategories within the
copyright area to unlisted broad categories within the patent area in
order to determine applicability of the Sears -Compco principle is to
miss the point. Rather, the fact that sound recordings (prior to
February 1972) 106
 have been without copyright protection exhibits a
congressional intent to leave them in free competition.
A proper comparison, however, may be made between lack of
protection as to sound recordings as a class and lack of protection as
to unpatentable items in a broad patent category, such as pole
lamps. In the pole lamp situation, it may be said that, by congres-
sional determination, inventions lacking novelty have never been
removed from free competition. Similarly, it may be said that record
companies have not qualified in the past for copyright protection
because of a congressional determination that recordings lacked
creative originality, and that companies had no need for economic
incentives. 107 Thus, notwithstanding its authority to grant
monopolies, Congress decided to refrain from doing so, thereby
leaving the "writings" in the public domain free of federal or state
protection. 108
1 ° 2 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103
 Id. at 577-78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1 " Id. at 578 .
 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'°' Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1°e
	 notes 14 and 15 supra and accompanying text.
1 ° 7
 It is noteworthy that technology until recently may have made tape piracy impossible
on a large scale, thus reducing need for copyright protection of sound recordings. 412 U.S. at
563 n.17. It is also noteworthy that Congress' unfamiliarity with recording technology may
have prevented it from appreciating until recently that creativity, not mere duplication, is
involved in recording. These two factors could account for the belated passage of copyright
protection for sound recordings.
In The Goldstein Court implied other arguments against application of the Sears-
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In sum, assuming that the Sears-Compco principle does apply
to Goldstein, the Goldstein Court's position requires modification.
Sound logic does not support the Court's simultaneous affirmance of
Sears-Compco and validation of a California state law granting
copyright protection to sound recordings. On the contrary, the Court
could have coupled rejection of the federal preemption doctrine of
Sears and Compco with sanctioning of the California statute. Alter-
natively, it could have affirmed the Sears-Compco principle and,
applying it, found the California statute invalid under the supre-
macy clause 109 as interfering with the policies enunciated in the
federal copyright law, as interpreted in Sears and Compco.
UNLIMITED DURATION OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Aside from the questions of 'state authority, power, and juris-
diction to legislate as to copyright matters, state tape piracy statutes
granting infinite protection raise a different question of constitution-
ality. The question is whether the Constitution and federal legisla-
tion permit the states to grant Copyright protection for unlimited
times. The Court in Goldstein held that infinite state grants of
protection indeed meet constitutional requirements.' 1 ° Furthermore,
reading the copyright clause literally, the Court concluded that the
durational limit on copyright protection imposed by the Constitution
applied only to federal power."' Without any basis in precedent,
the Court reasoned that such a conclusion was warranted, because
state copyright protection has a very narrow reach geographically. It
would therefore pose a danger of no consequence, when compared
with the nationwide protection granted by Congress.
Study of the policy reasons underlying copyright protection
leads to the conclusion that the Court was wrong in deciding as it
did on this issue. Copyrights are meant to provide a balance be-
tween the personal monopoly which works as an incentive for artis-
tic creation and the public's interest in maximum dissemination.' 12
The balance requires a time limit for the copyright,' because an idea
cannot be disseminated freely to the public if it is perpetually
Compco principle, by reference to recordings as property and not ideas. Id. at 571. The
argument stated explicitly is that while Sears and Compco pose questions of copying, Gold-
stein is a question of misappropriation. 316 F. Supp. at 350. It is submitted that this
argument is incorrect because Goldstein does in fact present a question of copying. See
International Tape Mfr. Ass'n v. Gerstein„ 174 U.S.P.Q. 198, 206-07 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
Admittedly, the copying is not identical to the Sears-Compco copying. However, the Goldstein
activity can hardly be characterized as misappropriation, which entails stealing; Goldstein
stole nothing, but instead purchased the albums and with his own resources copied them.
Thus, since stealing is nowhere an issue, the cases are indistinguishable on this point, and the
Sears-Compco principle must apply to Goldstein,
109
 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
11 ° 412 U.S. at 561.
111
 Id. at 560.
112
 See Kurlantzick, The Constitutionality of State Law Protection of Sound Recordings,
5 Conn. L. Rev. 204, 223 (1972).
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monopolized by the artist. Aside from the effect on the public's
interest in free access to expressions of ideas, copyright protection,
while it lasts, increases the cost of goods protected. While competi-
tion would arguably drive prices down in a free and open market,
this monopoly would allow its owner to charge higher prices since he
is the sole provider, of the desired goods. 113 These two costs of
copyright monopolies are tolerated in the Constitution in order to
encourage a desirable level of intellectual output, which can benefit
society as a whole. Excessive state protection, though admittedly
affecting a smaller number of people, imposes the same kinds of
costs on the people affected as does excessive federal protection,
with the same detrimental effect. 114 Excessive state protection also
destroys the antimonopolistic federal copyright scheme of allowing
free access to products on the market after a limited time)"
There are three seemingly good but finally unconvincing argu-
ments which the Goldstein Court might have made, but did not, in
support of its holding as to durational limits. 16 First, the Court
might have stated that, since unfettered state copyright power ante-
dated the Constitution, it overrides constitutional policy considera-
tions. However, contrary to this argument is the explicit assumption
of Wheaton v. Peters'' 7
 that constitutional policies override previous
policies, that the Constitution is not a: continuation but a new
beginning to copyright policy in the United States. As a second
argument, the Court might have asserted that the Constitution gave
Congress the power to grant to the states authority to create
copyright protection of unlimited duration. However, this argument
would fail as illogical. If Congress may not itself grant copyrights of
unlimited duration, it may not reasonably confer that authority on
another body.'" Third, the Court might have stated that if states
can grant copyrights of unlimited duration for unpublished
works," 9
 then they have the same power as to published works.
113
 See Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Ilarv. L. Rev. 281 (1970).
114
 Kurlantzick, supra note 112, at 223. It is apparent from recent landmark cases in the
antitrust area, rejecting mergers of companies comprising only a small percentage of a market,
that the trend is to avoid even small departures from anti-monopolistic principles. In United
States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 550-53 (1966), the Court struck down a merger
which involved only 4.5% of a national market, because the merger substantially lessened
competition in Wisconsin, where Pabst by merger owned 24% of the beer market, and in the
'Wisconsin-Illinois-Michigan region, where Pabst owned 11% of the market. Similarly, in
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272, 278 (1966), the Court outlawed a
merger involving only 7.5% of the grocery sales in metropolitan Los Angeles, simply to
preserve competition by arresting the trend toward concentration in its incipiency.
113 412 U.S. at 574 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
118
 Kurlantzick makes these three arguments and rejects them as explained in text at
notes 117-20 infra. See Kurlantzick, supra note 112, at 224-27.
' 17 33 U.S. 374, 420-21, 8 Pet. 591, 661 (1834).
118
 Kurlantzick, supra note 112, at 225.
118
 The traditional state common law authority to regulate unpublished works is given
explicit statutory legitimacy in 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
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However, this argument fails as well because the state power
vis-à-vis durational limit as to unpublished works has never been
tested. Moreover, if it were tested, the resolution would arguably be
in favor of durational limits, since a creator's interest in his own
work dies when he dies, and family interests in maintaining exclu-
sive rights to unpublished works diminish as time progresses. 120 In
sum, a strong argument may be made as to the unconstitutionality
of tape piracy statutes without durational limits.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Goldstein Court should
have decided that the California tape piracy statute was unconstitu-
tional in at least one of three ways. First, the Court could have read
the copyright clause of the Constitution as a grant of exclusive
copyright power to the federal government, as the only meaningful
method of balancing the interests of the author against those of the
public. Second, the Court could have found the statute violative of
the supremacy clause of the Constitution by application of the
Sears-Compco principle of federal preemption, by which the absence
of federal copyright protection is to imply conscious inaction by
Congress, leaving unprotected items purposefully within the public
domain in free competition. Finally, the Court might reasonably
have invalidated the statute (of unlimited duration) on the grounds
that durational limit is required by the. Constitution and policies
enunciated in federal law.
Admittedly, such a decision would have left the record com-
panies and millions of fair-minded Americans with an uneasy result:
tape pirates would have been completely free to pirate records in
California. But, the Goldstein decision produces an uneasy result as
well: the Court has improperly entered a frontier area of the
copyright law in which it is ill-equipped to resolve conflicts affecting
such diverse interests and controlling such large amounts of
money.' 21 In the most recent copyright legislation Congress did
prescribe copyright protection for recordings "fixed" between Feb-
ruary 1972 and January 1975.122 But, this leaves a majority of
' 2  Kurlantzick, supra note 112, at 225-26.
121
 See Brandeis' dissent in INS, 248 U.S. at 267. Some of the people affected by
copyright protection for sound recordings include record companies, artists, arrangers, techni-
cians, performers, music publishers, and advertisers. Yarnell, Recording Piracy is
Everybody's Burden: An Examination of its Causes, Effects and Remedies, 20 Bull. of the
Copyright Soc'y of the U.S.A. 234, 235 (1973). In 1970, there were at least 900 commercial
record companies in operation nationwide. In 1968 the gross sales of disc phonograph records,
based on list price, amounted to $860 million. The gross sales of authorized tapes totaled at
least $250 million. 316 F. Supp. at 343-44.
122
 Pub. L. No, 92-140 (Oct. 15, 1971). "A sound recording is 'fixed' when the complete
series of sounds constituting the work is first produced on a final master recording that is later
reproduced in published copies." 37 C.F. R, § 202.15a(b) (1973). The amendment's limitation
to three years was arguably caused by an immediate. need for interim legislation to meet
international as well as national demands, coupled with a congressional desire to leave the
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recordings unprotected by uniform federal law. Unfortunately, in
attempting to undermine the distasteful business of tape piracy, the
Court set aside sound legal reasoning for a cause that, to be handled
properly, required legislative attention and revision of the federal
Copyright Act to include sound recordings explicitly within its
scope. Effective relief will come only when Congress decides to
assert its full power in the copyright field, by enacting a permanent
version of its tape piracy statute. At that time, the Goldstein deci-
sion will admittedly be rendered moot with respect to tape and
sound recordings. However, it will remain a misguided precedent
for future cases regarding state protection of federally unprotected
classes of writings.
SUSAN KAGAN LANGE
Labor Law—Civil Rights Act of 1964—Burdens of Proof in Em-
ployment Discrimination Cases—McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green.' —Percy H. Green, a black mechanic, was hired by the
McDonnell Douglas Corporation in 1956. In 1963, Green requested
and was granted a transfer to a position as a laboratory
technician—a position with no union security—in the aircraft man-
ufacturing plant in St. Louis. In 1964, Green was laid off along with
a number of other workers from his department as a result of a
decrease in work load.
Green had been active in the civil rights movement during his
tenure with McDonnell Douglas. He protested his discharge as being
racially motivated to the President's Commission on Civil Rights;
the United States Departments of Justice, the Navy, and Defense;
and the Missouri Commission on Human Rights. During late 1964
and 1965, Green protested 'McDonnell Douglas' allegedly racially
discriminatory hiring practices as a member of CORE and AC-
TION, two civil rights groups. The protests included picketing the
home of James F. McDonnell, chairman of the board of McDonnell
Douglas; a "stall-in" which blocked the main highway access,route
to the McDonnell Douglas plant by means of parking rows of cars in
the road; and a "lock-in" during which certain McDonnell Douglas
employees were locked into a downtown St. Louis office building
field open in view of contemplated major reforms of the Copyright Act in the near future.
Yarnell, supra note 121, at 242. However, Justice Douglas concluded that, notwithstanding
the strong drive for federal protection of sound recordings, Congress was reluctant to enact
this amendment for more than a limited trial period in which this new monopoly approach
could be considered. 412 U.S. at 574 (dissenting opinion).
' 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The statement of facts presented in this note is digested from the
Supreme Court opinion, id. at 794-98; the circuit court opinion, 463 F.2d 337, 338-40 (8th Cir.
1972); and the district court opinion, 318 F. Supp, 846, 847-50 (E. D. Mo. 1970).
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